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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates central ideas in the emergent field of Earth
Jurisprudence. It suggests that development of conceptual and practical
frameworks for an earth justice system predicated on rights of nature is
currently at a nascent stage, but such ‘creative uncertainty’ provides
scholars and practitioners with opportunities to identify and articulate
new conceptual frameworks which avoid some of the hazards of human
exceptionalism.
Part I suggests that the concept of ‘rights of nature’ rests upon
contestable epistemological and ontological claims and that an effective
Earth Jurisprudence will require a continual negotiation of
interpretative disagreements and frameworks for action.
Part II explores the ‘promiscuous concept’ of nature and argues
that the ways in which biophysical reality is articulated and represented
in some Earth Jurisprudence scholarship requires further investigation.
With reference to the concept of ‘rights’, parts III and IV
investigate the relationship between the idea of a non-anthropocentric
earth justice system and the pragmatic imperatives of human juridical
systems. It suggests that the incommensurability between a theory of
earth justice and practice of an earth justice system will continue to
involve exponents of Earth Jurisprudence in a host of scientific, legal,
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political and ethical tensions, ones demanding an ongoing negotiation
of conceptual frameworks together with a pragmatic willingness to
concede to the normative anthropocentrism of juridical frameworks.

2013] MAPPING THE TERRAIN OF EARTH JURISPRUDENCE

3

INTRODUCTION
‘The hunt for any natural resting point is as unrealistic as to reach
1
out for the horizon.’

Earth jurisprudence is an emerging area of law in which the
integrity and health of ecosystems become a central concern of human
legal and political institutions. In recent years, several countries have
proposed constitutional reforms which mandate legal recognition of
ecosystems’ ‘right to exist’. In September 2008 Ecuador became the
first country in the world to declare constitutional ‘rights of nature’ and
to codify a new system of environmental governance.2 The new laws
grant citizens the right to sue on behalf of an ecosystem, even if not
injured themselves.3
At this stage in its development, both the practice and theory of this
emergent jurisprudence occupy indeterminate terrain, but one already
inscribed by humanist precepts of what ‘rights’ and ‘nature’ might
consist of. Mindful that nature and rights are contested concepts with
negotiable meanings; this paper identifies and investigates central
epistemological and ontological thresholds with a view to contributing
to the development of conceptual terrain for earth jurisprudence which
avoid the hazards of human exceptionalism.
This exploration is informed by emergent scholarship in the fields
of ecological realism, speculative realism and object oriented ontology.
What these movements offer are conceptual frameworks which seek to
uphold the autonomy of reality against the depredations of
anthropocentrism, ones within which humans have no particularly
privileged place4.

1

. Arne Naess, Reflections about Total Views, 51(1) PHILOSOPHY AND
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 16, 25 (1964).
2

. KENNETH J MIJESKI & SCOTT H BECK, PACHAKUTIK AND THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF THE ECUADORIAN INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT 114-115 (2011).
3

. Clare Kendall, A new law of nature, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 24, 2008l, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/sep/24/equador.conservation. As one
of the architects of this new legal framework observed, Ecuador has taken a step into
the ‘legal unknown’ and ‘a lot of people will be watching what happens’.
4

.

LEVI BRYANT, THE DEMOCRACY OF OBJECTS 40 (2011).
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While recognizing a tension between the pragmatic imperatives of
normative systems of human governance and the conceptual terrain of
metaphysical realism, this paper enters a ‘realm of creative uncertainty’
with a view to the identification of possibilities for dialogue between
emergent speculative fields, one which may inform the development of
a hybrid philosophical and juridical framework capable of responding to
urgent ecological crises.
I. LANDSCAPE: AN ECOLOGY OF IDEAS
‘We gain knowledge but only to lose the world.’

5

Mike Bell observes that the search for an earth jurisprudence is
‘much like setting out on a journey in unfamiliar territory without an
adequate map’.6 It is a journey which requires an interrogation of our
reasons for embarking upon it, an articulation of the conceptual
frameworks which inform it, and an identification of what is hoped will
be achieved. Unavoidably, perhaps, the journey is one tainted by
anthropocentrism and inscribed by deeply embedded notions of human
exceptionalism. Whether it is one which may circumvent contamination
by humanist frames of reference will, in all likelihood, remain an area of
contention.
Thomas Berry first proposed earth jurisprudence as an emerging
framework for law in 2001.7 As a legal philosophy, earth jurisprudence
is predicated upon the idea that humans are part of an interrelated
community of beings and that the welfare of each member of this
community is directly connected to, and dependent upon, the welfare of
the earth community as a whole.8 Some proponents of earth
5

. Cary Wolfe, Introduction to STANLEY CAVELL, CORA DIAMOND, JOHN
MCDOWELL, IAN HACKING & CARY WOLFE, PHILOSOPHY AND ANIMAL LIFE, at 5
(2008).
6

. Mike Bell, Thomas Berry and an Earth Jurisprudence: An Exploratory Essay,
19(1) THE TRUMPETER 69 (2003).
7

.

8

Id.

. CORMAC CULLINAN, A History of Wild Law, in EXPLORING WILD LAW: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF EARTH JURISPRUDENCE (Peter Burdon ed., 2011). Because, it is
reasonably safe to assume, the universe is not terra nullius, the notion of ‘earth
community’, is itself problematic. It may be that limiting earth jurisprudence to
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jurisprudence advocate the recognition of ‘rights of nature’, a system of
governance which extends the protection of laws beyond humans to the
entire ‘earth community’.9 These authors assert that such laws may
function as regulatory systems in a way that is consistent with
‘fundamental laws’, or the ‘Great Jurisprudence’.10
During the last decade there have been a number of legislative
initiatives which enshrine rights for nature in domestic legal systems. In
2008 Ecuador was the first country to introduce constitutional
recognition of rights for nature.11 On 30 March 2011, the first successful
legal challenge recognizing such rights under Article 71 of the
Ecuadorian Constitution was heard in the Provincial Justice Court of
Loja.12 In the case, the Court issued a constitutional injunction against
the Provincial Government of Loja in favor of the Vilcabamba River. It
held that a project to widen the Vilcabamba-Quinara road, which had
‘planetary’ thinking is another form of anthropocentrism in which humans are
privileging their specific ecology. The notion that we are all members of a complex
and diverse community of life on Earth and that we (humans) have ethical obligations
to defend and strengthen the integrity of the Earth community for the sake of its current
and future members, might arguably exclude the indivisible inclusion of this
community in a complex and diverse cosmos. An inclusive ecocentric sensibility would
suggest that ecological perspectives encompass the much larger cosmological context
of life, including physical ‘laws’, which have developed in response to a complex series
of extra planetary conditions. The writers wish to acknowledge the contributions of
their colleague, Aidan Ricketts, for his succinct articulation of these ideas. See also
QUENTIN MEILLASSOUX, AFTER FINITUDE: AN ESSAY ON THE NECESSITY OF
CONTINGENCY (2008), (suggesting that ‘the cosmos compels us to face the contingency
of thought and to rethink the priority of human access.’), EDGAR MORIN, INTRODUCTION
TO A HUMAN POLITICS (1999), (arguing that ‘all entities in the universe are enfolded
within the ecology of the cosmos.’
9

.

CULLINAN, supra note 8.

10

See THOMAS BERRY, THE GREAT WORK: OUR WAY INTO THE FUTURE (1999).

11

MIJESKI & BECK, supra note 2.

.
.

12

. Ecuador’s Constitutional Rights for Nature provides that ‘Nature has the right
to exist, persist, maintain and regenerate its vital cycles, structure, functions and its
processes’ and ‘a right to an integral restoration’. Importantly, it identifies juridical
mechanisms for the recognition, regulation and enforcement of these rights. See The
Panchamama Alliance, First Successful Case Enforcing Rights of Nature in Ecuador,
July 29, 2011, available at http://www.pachamama.org/news/first-successful-caseenforcing-rights-of-nature-in-ecuador (last visited May 25, 2013).
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been underway for three years without studies on its environmental
impact, directly violated the rights of nature by increasing the river flow,
provoking a risk of disaster from floods and adversely affecting the
riverside populations that utilize the river’s resources. The Court
declared that the defendant had ‘violated the right that nature has to be
fully respected in its existence and maintenance of its vital cycles,
structure, functions, and evolutionary processes’.13
In the United States, local ordinances have been passed that
partially recognize rights of nature within local communities,14 and
Bolivia is currently set to legislate the ‘Law of Mother Earth’ which
identifies eleven specific rights for nature.15 In 2010 Bolivian President
13

. Provincial Court of Justice of Loja, sentence No. 11121-2011-0010, March 30,
2011. The Constitutional Injunction established:
 The suitability and efficacy of the Constitutional injunction as the only way to
remedy in an immediate manner the environmental damage focusing on the
undeniable, elemental, and essential importance of nature, and taking into
account the evident process of degradation;
 That, based on the precautionary principle, until it is objectively demonstrated
that the probability of certain danger that a project undertaken in an
established area does not produce contamination or lead to environmental
damage, it is the responsibility of the constitutional judges to incline towards
the immediate protection and the legal tutelage of the rights of nature, doing
what is necessary to prevent contamination or call for remedy;
 The recognition that damages to nature are generational damages, defined as
such for their magnitude that impact not only the present generation but also
future ones;
 That the plaintiffs should not have to prove the existence of damages but that
the Provincial Government of Loja, as the entity that administers the activity,
had to have provide certain evidence that the widening the road would not
affect the environment;
 That the defendant’s argument that the population needs roads does not apply
since there is no sacrifice of constitutional rights because the case did not
question the widening of the road, but the respect for the constitutional rights
of nature. http://therightsofnature.org/first-ron-case-ecuador
14

. See generally Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund, Ordinance
Archive,
September
24,
2011,
available
at
http://celdf.org/ordinancearchive?preview=1&cache=0 (last visited May 25, 2013).
15

. These rights include: the right to life and to exist; the right to continue vital
cycles and processes free from human alteration; the right to pure water and clean air;
the right to balance; the right not to be polluted; and the right to not have cellular
structure modified or genetically altered. It will also enshrine the right of nature ‘to not
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Evo Morales convened a World Conference of Peoples on Climate
Change and Mother Earth’s Rights in Cochabamba. A significant
outcome of that conference was the drafting of a Universal Declaration
on the Rights of Mother Earth, a document which ‘demands a paradigm
shift and a conscious effort on the part of man [sic] to own up to our
errors and settles on amending our patterns of production and
consumption.’16 This Declaration was presented by Ecuadorian
ambassador Pablo Solon to the United Nations Climate Change
Conference in June 2011.
Mindful of these initiatives, the development of conceptual and
practical frameworks for an earth justice system predicated on rights of
nature remains at a nascent stage. The emergent discourse and practice
of earth jurisprudence will require decisions to be made relating to the
ways in which biophysical reality (including ‘nature’), and juridical
concepts (including ‘rights’) are articulated and represented. But
because the content of such epistemological and ontological claims rest
on contestable assumptions, it is to be supposed that the determination
of these frameworks will be the subject of continuing negotiation among
both scholars and practitioners of emergent earth governance systems.
As a transdisciplinary endeavor, the development of frameworks
for earth jurisprudence will be informed by a range of disciplinary
paradigms including those of law, philosophy and the social, natural and
biological sciences. But because each discipline employs different
historically and culturally specific methods of knowledge production,
any attempt to arrive at a coherent and unified framework for Earth
jurisprudence would risk misrepresenting the richness and complexity of
its conceptual terrain.17 Consequently, recognition that knowledge
be affected by mega-infrastructure and development projects that affect the balance of
ecosystems and the local inhabitant communities’. See John Vidal, Law of Mother
Earth expected to prompt radical new conservation and social measures in South
American
nation,
INFINITE
UNKNOWN
(August
12,
2011),
http://www.infiniteunknown.net/2011/04/12/bolivias-law-of-mother-earth-establishes11-new-rights-for-nature/.
16

. Nnimmo Bassey, Vision: The Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth is our
roadmap to a livable future, in THE RIGHTS OF NATURE, THE CASE FOR A UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF MOTHER EARTH (Council of Canadians, Global
Exchange & Fundacion Pachamama eds., 2011).
17

. Edgar Morin suggests that human beings are open to possession by their own
ideologies and systems of belief. As a result, he argues, knowledge production is
variable across paradigmatic divides which renders problematic the idea of positive or
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production is variable across paradigmatic divides renders problematic
the identification of a stable and non negotiable landscape for an earth
justice system.
Edgar Morin recognizes that thinking of knowledge as the product
of disciplinary paradigms necessarily gives rise to a ‘realm of creative
uncertainty’.18 Because human beings are open to possession by their
ideologies and systems of belief, the ‘ecology of ideas’, Morin asserts,
has a significant impact on the lived perceptions and practices of homo
sapiens and on everything that may be affected by them. For this reason,
it is not just knowledge that is of central importance in the solving of
problems, but rather a ‘knowledge of knowledge.’ 19 It may be supposed
that the identification and articulation of this ‘knowledge of knowledge’,
will engender areas of disagreement among scholars, practitioners and
activists and will be the subject of continuing negotiation for the
development of the theory and practice of earth jurisprudence.
Nearly half a century ago, Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss
observed that the conceptual frameworks informing ecological thinking
consisted of a ‘wide variety of fundamentally different and even
incompatible philosophies.’20 Næss neither proposed nor advocated a
single ecophilosophy but emphasized that his version represented only
one account. His extensive corpus of work on ‘ecosophy’ reflects a
range of views concerning the meaning of nature and of ‘reality’. In it,
what began as a metaphysical account of a single form of reality or
‘unified science’ was gradually replaced with a pluralistic approach
which recognized the possibility of a number of competing and
scientific theories, any of which, Næss observed, could be said to be
compatible with ‘reality’.21
stable knowledge. EDGAR MORIN, JOURNAL DE PLOZEVET (2001). For a detailed
investigation of the concept of knowledge production and disciplinary paradigms, see
e.g. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS (1970); THOMAS KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3rd ed. 1996).
18

MORIN, supra note 8.

19

Id.

20

NAESS, supra note 1.

.
.
.

21

. ARNE NAESS, THE PLURALIST AND POSSIBILIST ASPECT OF THE SCIENTIFIC
ENTERPRISE (1972).
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While Næss acknowledged that contemplation of the ‘vast plurality
of possible worlds’ can undermine the capacity to respond to serious
problems that we encounter,22 Catriona Sandilands suggests that a
‘strategy of healthy multiplicity’ for environmental politics can provide
us with an opportunity to be actively engaged citizens whose role it is to
help to ‘clarify, refine and develop the ‘truthfulness’ of various
perspectives’. If we don’t know in advance of the conversation what
environmental justice will look like, Sandilands argues, then we have to
pay very close attention to how the world appears to the others with
whom we share responsibility for its construction:
‘Environmental justice politics invites the appearance of a variety
of different claims to know nature and to know justice. Without a clear
sense of what an ecological rationality might look like before processes
of debate and politicization occur, environmental justice requires a
‘necessary but critically interacting multiplicity of views on nature’.23
The views articulated here suggest that a recognition of the
contingency of meaning will oblige scholars and practitioners of earth
jurisprudence to continually negotiate interpretative disagreements and
frameworks for action. They also suggest that the tension between
skepticism about knowledge and the pragmatic imperatives of effective
strategic interventions provide opportunities for the development of
inclusive dialogues which ‘avoid the manifold dangers to democratic
societies of totalizing moral schemes’.24
In the discussion which follows, this paper identifies a number of
threshold epistemological and ontological claims which, it is suggested,
will require investigation and negotiation with a view to the
identification of frameworks to inform the theoretical terrain of, and
pragmatic strategies for, an effective earth justice system.

22

. Arne Næss, The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology Movement: A
Summary, 16 INQUIRY 95 (1973).
23

. Catriona Sandilands, Opinionated Natures: Toward a Green Public Culture, in
DEMOCRACY AND THE CLAIMS OF NATURE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR A NEW
CENTURY 149-150 (Ben A. Minter & Bob Pepperman Taylor eds., 2002).
24

. Cary Wolfe, Old Orders for New: Ecology Animal Rights, and The Poverty of
Humanism, in AMERICAN CULTURE, THE DISCOURSE OF SPECIES AND POSTHUMANIST
THEORY, 22 (2003).
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II. THRESHOLD: THE MEANING OF NATURE AND ‘NATURE’S MEANING’
‘To philosophize about nature is to produce it.’

25

Kate Soper observes that nature is a ‘promiscuous concept’. 26 And
as Michael Carolan notes, the term ‘nature’ is used to speak of any
number of things: from the ‘not natural,’ such as the urban landscape; to
the nature of unspoiled wilderness; to the forces of nature, such as
gravity and natural selection; to the nature of the universe, of dark
matter and galaxies; and finally, to human nature. Is there any hope,
Carolan asks, of ‘unsnarling this terminological quagmire’, or will we be
forced to abandon the concept in its quest for conceptual and analytic
specificity? 27
Structural anthropologists have suggested that the binary of nature
and culture is one by which human societies organize their conceptual
world28 and poststructuralist thinkers have demonstrated that the
meaning of this dualism is a shifting one which is ‘co-implicated with
power, desire, and other such forces’.29 Whether represented as an
artifact of human consciousness (nomos) or the result of biophysical

25

. FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON SCHELLING, IDEAS FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF
NATURE (IV, 3) (EE Harris & P Health [trans], Cambridge Univ Press,1988) (1797).
26

. KATE SOPER, WHAT IS NATURE? 15-20 (1995). Soper argues that nature exists
in both a realist sense, thereby making room for very real biophysical limits, and in a
sociocultural sense, so as to provide conceptual space for social critique and the everimportant analysis of power. She identifies three ‘kinds’ of nature: external nature (the
assumption that nature is external to, and different from, society); intrinsic nature
(nature as ‘an inherent and essential quality’ of something) and universal nature (nature
as a global ecological system).
27

. Michael Carolan, Society, Biology, and Ecology: Bringing Nature Back Into
Sociology’s Disciplinary Narrative Through Critical Realism, 18 ORGANIZATION &
ENVIRONMENT 393 (2005).
28

. CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP (Rodney
Needham [trans], Beacon Press, 1969) (1949).
29

. Adrian Ivakhiv, Social Nature: Collapsing Dichotomies Without Unraveling
The Fabric Of Things (August 18, 2011), http://www.archivefire.net/2011/05/ivakhivon-nature-and-collapsing.html.

2013] MAPPING THE TERRAIN OF EARTH JURISPRUDENCE

11

processes (physis), what nature ‘is’ and what nature ‘means’ are likely to
remain contested areas.30
The consequences of such contestation for an earth justice system
predicated on rights for nature is a problematic tension between the
requirement of a concept of nature upon which to ground action, and an
awareness of the impossibility of settling upon a definitive version of
what nature ‘is’.31 As a result, those concerned to develop an earth
jurisprudence may be obliged to base their praxis on accounts of nature
which they know to be contestable and contingent. They may be assisted
however, by the work of contemporary political ecologists who are
concerned not only to interrogate the interdependence of human and
nonhuman realms, but also to question the assumptions which support
the division of the natural from the cultural. The aim of political ecology
is not to protect ‘nature’ but to problematize the social and scientific
processes that constitute our understanding of the world. By bringing
questions of nature and culture into the processes of politics, political
ecology gestures towards new possibilities for political theory which
move beyond a paralyzing denial of nature and which involve the
nonhuman world as actors in democratic political processes.
Peter Knudtson and David Suzuki have suggested that ‘ecosystems
are human constructs to which nature is blind’.32 While Bruno Latour
agrees that ideas of nature are historically situated constructions of
human consciousness, he offers what he claims is a non anthropocentric
account of nature in which ‘reality’ emerges independently of human
interpretation. We should not, he contends, aim to marry culture and
nature, but to dissolve the distinction all together.33 Latour posits a
world of highly complex relations between humans and ‘non-humans’
(things, animals), in which the latter are granted the same ‘amount’ of
30

. Κ W Junker, Reading Nature Through Culture in Plato and Aristotle’s works
on Law, 7(1) PHRONIMON 61, 63 (1999). Junker argues that the binary trap of physis
and nomos lies in believing that an understanding of nature can be achieved by creating
a hierarchy of derivation. Once we allow our understanding of nature to be framed by
this hierarchy, Junker says, scientific empiricism almost inevitably leads to the
contestable conclusion that nature is primary and culture is derivative.
31

. See also CORMAC CULLINAN, WILD LAW: A MANIFESTO FOR EARTH JUSTICE
(2003).
32

PETER KNUDTSON & DAVID SUZUKI, WISDOM OF THE ELDERS 44 (1992).

33

BRUNO LATOUR, POLITICS OF NATURE (Catherine Porter [trans], 2004).

.
.
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agency as humans, resulting in a symmetrical, non-hierarchical
structure. His political ecology is one in which animate and inanimate
entities are ‘actants’ in networks or ‘assemblages’. Because all entities
have equal ontological status, modes of classification predicated upon a
subject/object dualism are avoided.34
In his rejection of the basic distinction between nature and culture,
Latour claims that the development of modern (western) society has
rested on ‘a collective self-delusion’ and that the processes of setting the
natural world against culture as either a chaotic force that needs to be
controlled or as a ‘mother nature’ in balance, is unique to the western
philosophical tradition.35 Within this tradition, nature is regarded as
outside the realm of politics which is seen as an exclusively human
affair. Latour contends, however, that nature is not a particular sphere of
reality but the result of a political division. In a world where nature has
become one of widespread political concern, a view of politics as an
exclusively human affair, he argues, ‘leaves nature to the scientists’.
Although we should subject science’s claims of a faithful representation
of nature to the same criticism as that leveled at our political
representatives, Latour claims the scientist to be a ‘highly useful
representative’ of the nonhuman realm. 36
While he acknowledges that the politics of nature is ‘a rather
troublesome one,’ Latour claims that a ‘parliament of things’ offers
possibilities for a non-anthropocentric participatory democracy in which
nonhuman voices are taken into account. Arguing that representative
democracy requires representation for non-humans as well as humans,
Latour advocates a ‘global parliament’ for non-humans as well as for
34

. Id.; See also MANUEL DE LANDA, A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIETY:
ASSEMBLAGE THEORY AND SOCIAL COMPLEXITY (2006); De Landa also proposes an
approach to social ontology which asserts the autonomous nature of social entities, but
one which takes Gilles Deleuze’s theory of assemblages as its main framework.
35

. BRUNO LATOUR, WE HAVE NEVER BEEN MODERN 10-11 (Catherine Porter
[trans], 1993). (Identifying two demarcations that he sees as crucial to the formation of
modernity: the first demarcation is between the domain of nature and the domain of
culture, and the second between the processes of purification and the processes of
translation. The work of purification refers to the attempt to separate nature and culture
into ‘two entirely distinct ontological zones: that of humans on the one hand; that of
nonhumans on the other’.)
36

.

Id.
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humans, each ‘representing their constituencies’ and no one being able
to claim to represent the general will.’37
While Latour acknowledges that the process of representing
nonhumans is not simple, for him it is little different from the process of
representing humans. In Latourian democratic politics scientific
spokespersons play an important role because it is through them that non
human entities acquire a ‘voice’. The divide, he says, is not between
science and politics but between ‘trusted and not trusted
representatives’.38
While the efficacy of Latour’s parliament of things requires
confidence in ‘trusted’ representatives, his model pays scant regard to
asymmetries of power between spokespersons and nonhuman entities
and the difficulties of recovering the voices and determining the
interests of these entities. While Foucault did not extend his concept of
biopolitical power to non human entities, it is suggested that discourses
of human exceptionalism remain integral to processes of biopolitical
normalization.39 So while Latour’s work is motivated by a democratic
impulse to include a multiplicity of voices, if it hopes to offer a proper
democratic politics, it will have to find ways to deal with hierarchies of
interest and differentials of power.40
Because it will be humans who represent and/or ‘speak’ for non
human entities in an earth justice system, these are also significant
issues for earth jurisprudence. How and by whom will non human
37

. Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: East and West Perspectives, 4(1) ETHICS &
GLOBAL POLITICS 71 (2011).
38

.

Id. at 144.

39

. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL 1: THE WILL TO
KNOWLEDGE (1998). Biopolitics for Foucault is political power exercised on whole
populations in every aspect of human life. Through power saturated discourses and
knowledge, the exercise of biopower produces and makes possible permissible modes
of being and thinking while disqualifying and/or making others impossible.
40

. See Srikanth Mallavarapu and Amit Prasad, Facts, Fetishes, and the
Parliament of Things: Is There any Space for Critique?, (20)2 SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY
185, 193 (2006). See also Donna Haraway, MODEST WITNESS@SECOND_MILLENIUM.
FEMALEMAN MEETS ONCOMOUSE: FEMINISM AND TECHNOSCIENCE 280 (1997),
(suggesting that it is ‘less epistemologically, politically, and emotionally powerful to
see that there are …hybrids of the human and non-human … than to ask for whom and
how these hybrids work.’)
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voices be represented and by what processes will the interests of
nonhuman entities be determined? These are normative concerns that an
earth justice system predicated on rights for nature will be compelled to
negotiate.
Adam Robbert agrees that the idea of nature can get us into some
‘grave conceptual cul-de-sacs’ and seeks to reframe the conversation by
‘sliding the idea of nature out of the vice-grip of nature-culture dualism.’
While it is arguable that his model of ecological domains is, like
Latour’s, one which remains trapped in a realm of ideas, it offers a non
humanist and multiplicitous account of nature which avoids the
polarization of biocentrism and anthropocentrism. Robbert identifies
three ontologically concrete ecological domains: natural ecology, media
ecology and knowledge ecology. These domains are not bounded
systems but co-emergent ‘ecologies of objects’ which he claims are
capable of accounting for the ontological and epistemological
circumstances of all organisms:
‘Different organisms, cultures, or species literally enact, abstract,
and construct, distinct ontological domains which have ongoing
recursive effects.’41
Because nonhumans contain and participate in each of these
ecologies, Robbert’s model both avoids biocentric notions of organism
and environment and provides a non anthropocentric ‘principle of
relationships’ not situated relative to human experience.42
Edgar Morin agrees that there is no a stable boundary between
‘humans’ and ‘nature.’ Attentive to how the meaning of being human is
tied up with our constructions of nature, he contends that what nature
‘is’, shifts in relation to epistemological, social and political-ethical
changes. Nature, for Morin, is ‘inextricably confounded with humanity’s
41

. Adam Robbert, Three Ecologies and the Composition of Space (May 30,
2011), available at http://knowledge-ecology.com/2011/05/13/three-ecologies-and-thecomposition-of-space/.
42

. See Adam Robbert, Three Ecologies and the Composition of Space,
KNOWLEDGE
ECOLOGY
BLOG
(May
13,
2011),
http://knowledgeecology.com/2011/05/13/three-ecologies-and-the-composition-of-space/.
Robbert
argues that a horseshoe crab, for example, would have its own natural, media, and
knowledge ecologies and that the three ecologies make a step towards accounting for
the ontological and epistemological circumstances of all organisms, and not just
humans.
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projects and self-understandings.’43 He embraces an ecological approach
to understand not only environmental systems but also systems of
knowledge, identity and perception. Human perception, Morin claims, is
in a dynamic, ecological relationship to ideas and paradigms that reframe perception itself in an ongoing evolutionary process:
‘What we need is an ecologized thinking that considers the vital
link of every living, human, or social system to its environment’. 44
Morin describes his approach as a ‘fundamental anthropology’, one
which incorporates elements of biology, psychology, anthropology,
ecology and systems theory into a ‘non-centered systems approach’.
This anthropology asserts the inadequacy of both pan-biologisms and
pan-culturalisms, in favor of more complex representations of truth that
are neither biological nor cultural, but which reveal nature as a multiple
objective reality disclosed by multiple empirical sciences.45 To this
extent, unlike Latour, Morin’s anthropological approach is perhaps
better equipped to embrace an ontological pluralism capable of
acknowledging cultural specificities associated with the concept of
nature.46
Morin contends that every entity in the universe, (be it a thought, a
mythos, a political movement or a thermodynamic energy gradient) are
enfolded within the ecology of the cosmos. This complex movement of
nature, culture, and thought, for Morin, is leading towards what he calls
the ‘Planetary Era,’ one which reveals relational and multidimensional
processes of influence that link the Earth into a planetary whole.47
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. EDGAR MORIN, ON COMPLEXITY: ADVANCES IN SYSTEMS THEORY,
COMPLEXITY, AND THE HUMANSCIENCES 138 (2008).
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MORIN, supra note 8, at 52.
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Morin’s aim is not to reduce the concreteness of ‘reality’ to a single
paradigm, but to reveal the mutually implicative character of perception
and world that constitutes the ecology of experience:
‘[I] think we construct our perception of the world, but with the
help of the world itself which, as it were, ‘lends us a hand’. What we
know is not the world itself, but the world along with our knowledge of
it. We cannot isolate the world from our structures of knowing. Mind
and world are inseparable.’ 48
Alf Hornborg’s relational epistemology also recognizes that human
cognition is a mutually constellating act that ‘designates simultaneously
the knower as a subject and the known as an object of knowledge’.
Hornborg’s analysis of power suggests that it is important to avoid
naturalizing ecological processes that background political and
economic practices of marginalization in the name of science. To this
extent, he identifies a tension between the view that an objective
biophysical environment exists and one which insists upon constructed
discourses of history and culture:
‘All ecosystems carry the imprints of human activity. In other
words, human social phenomena such as culture, language, and power
are really components of ecosystems.’49
Hornborg argues, however, that notions of nature as culturally
constructed projections of a historically embedded society are not
sufficient to understand contemporary ecological problems, nor are they
accurately descriptive of ontological spaces designated as ‘nature.’ He
contends that essentialist views that depict nature as existing ‘out there’
in a ‘pure’ state separate from human activity, also point to an
insufficient understanding of ecological processes:
‘If natural landscapes virtually everywhere carry traces of human
activity, then the conclusion must be that ‘nature’ is imbued with human
culture and that language intervenes in ecological processes.’ 50
Hornborg’s view is suggestive of a number of contemporary
frameworks which suggest that traditional conceptions of nature are
inimical to ecological thinking and which advocate an ‘end’ to nature.

48

.

MORIN, supra note 43, at 91.
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. ALF HORNBORG, THE POWER OF THE MACHINE: GLOBAL INEQUITIES OF
ECONOMY, TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT 192 (2001).
50
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For example, scholars in the emergent field of speculative realism
have advocated the development of an ecologically inspired ‘objectoriented’ philosophy that seeks to describe the nature of all relations as
ecological. As a new form of metaphysics which takes place in what
Gironi has called a ‘scientifico-philosophical hybrid field’,51 speculative
realism has developed as a response both to the epistemological prestige
and popular appeal of the natural sciences and to the failure of
continental philosophy to comprehensively respond to this science. With
reference to Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finititude, Gironi argues that
the last forty years of the physical sciences has powerfully presented to
humankind the disconcerting vastness of the ‘great outdoors’ and that in
their response to these developments, the speculative realists represent
‘a return to the true meaning of the Copernican Revolution’. Speculative
realism he says is not a doctrine, but an umbrella term for a variety of
programs which protest the rigid ideological categories of culture/nature
and are ‘committed to upholding the autonomy of reality against the
depredations of anthropocentrism’.52 Meillassoux’s speculative
metaphysics asserts that the sense of desolation and abandonment which
modern science instills in humanity’s conception of itself and of the
cosmos compels us to face the contingency of thought and to rethink the
priority of human access:
‘[I]t could be that contemporary philosophers have lost the great
outdoors, the absolute outside of pre-critical thinkers: that outside
which was not relative to us, and which was given as indifferent to
its own givenness to be what it is, existing in itself regardless of
whether we are thinking of it or not; that outside which thought
could explore with the legitimate feeling of being on foreign
53
territory—of being entirely elsewhere.’

Levi Bryant’s response to this sense of bereavement is the notion of
a ’wilderness ontology’, a cosmos within which humans are not
sovereigns of being and have no particularly privileged place. Within
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. Fabio Gironi, Science-Laden Theory: Outlines of an Unsettled Alliance, in
SPECULATIONS
I
(Paul
Ennis
ed.,
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such a wilderness there is no distinction between the natural and the
cultural, the human and the natural, but only a flat field in which
humans are simply ‘beings amongst beings’. Bryant’s wilderness
ontology is not conceived in terms of the absence of humans, but rather
in terms of a flat ontology in which humans are among beings without
enjoying any unilateral, sovereign role:
‘The most insignificant quark on the other side of the universe
makes its difference(s) without any relation to our consciousness or
knowledge of that quark. Difference is thus a matter of the ‘things
themselves’, not our relationship to things. In this regard, the Principle
of the Inhuman is formulated not so as to exclude the human—humans
and human artifacts, after all, make differences too—but rather to
underline the point that humans are beings among the swarm of
differences and hold no special or privileged place with respect to these
differences’.54
To this extent, Bryant’s speculative approach stands in stark
contrast with Neill Evernden’s suggestion that ‘through our conceptual
domestication of nature, we extinguish wild otherness even in the
imagination.’55 Bryant argues that Enlightenment thought was premised
on an ‘infantile and narcissistic fantasy’ of the world as a screen for
human intentions; one which enabled us to enjoy an imagined dominion
over the forces of nature itself. This ‘continuing immaturity’, he states,
fails to recognize the manner in which humankind is heteronomously
determined. Humans, Bryant suggests, only ever act in assemblages that
‘exceed our intentions and expectations’ and that unless we
acknowledge our entanglements, we will be unable to attend to the
‘strange strangers.’ 56 Together with Timothy Morton, Bryant uses the

54

. Levi Bryant, The Ontic Principle: Outline of an Object-Oriented Ontology, in
LEVI BRYANT, NICK SMICEK & GRAHAM HARMAN, THE SPECULATIVE TURN:
CONTINENTAL MATERIALISM AND REALISM 267 (Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek and
Graham Harman eds., 2011).
55

.

56

NEIL EVERNDEN, THE SOCIAL CREATION OF NATURE 116 (1992).

. See also TIMOTHY MORTON, ECOLOGY WITHOUT NATURE: RETHINKING
ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS 49 (2009). (Morton argues that ecological coexistence
consists of strange strangers, beings that are ‘ineradicably, irreducibly strange, strange
in their strangeness … surprisingly surprising’. These beings cannot be referred to as
animal, nonhuman nor as life forms since, Morton opines, if a virus is alive in any
meaningful sense, then so is a computer virus. The more we know about strange
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notion of ‘dark ecology’, one focused on mystery and the impossibility
of a human mind big enough to encompass the universe. Dark ecology is
predicated upon an awareness that objects and entities are never fully
present nor ever fully manifest themselves. What dark ecology
investigates is not the entities themselves, nor the environment which
contains them, but the shifting and changing relations among them.57
Bryant suggests that a ‘dark’ ecological politics invites us to ‘hang out
in the muck and muddiness of uncertainty’ and obliges us to constantly
reframe our view of the ecological.58
Timothy Morton’s agrees with Robbert that the major stumbling
block to ecological thinking is the image of nature itself. While many
ecological writers propose a new worldview, Morton suggests that their
passion to preserve the natural world leads them away from the ‘nature’
they revere. We should, Morton argues, avoid romantic and holistic
conceptions of nature which ‘avoid the challenge of radical
coexistence.’ 59 He then articulates an apparent paradox: to have a
properly ecological view, ‘we must relinquish the idea of nature once
and for all.’ 60
Morton suggests that the naïve empiricism of the positivist
philosopher and the equally impoverished idea of the social construction
of nature is, in the context of a twenty-first century ecological science,
inadequate. Rather, Morton argues that nature, culture and biophysical
strangers, Morton says, the stranger they become: ‘Are they alive? What is life? Are
they intelligent? What is intelligence? Are they people? Are we people?’).
57

. Levi Bryant, Black Ecology and the Ethical Real (June 29, 2011),
http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2011/06/29/black-ecology-and-the-ethical-real/.
58

. Levi Bryant, Beautiful Soul Syndrome, Dark Ecology, and Onticology (July
29, 2010), http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/07/29/beautiful-soul-syndromedark-ecology-and-onticology/.
59
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knowledge are collectively assembled elements of a complex and
shifting mosaic of historical and ecological contingencies. His integral
approach to ecology is one in which these elements are conceived in
terms of ‘assemblages’ rather than as ‘systems’. Intrinsically relative,
they are mutually enacting and inseparable. Consequently, ‘nature’ can
only ever be an abstract construction, ‘a horizon upon which culturalscientific modes of knowledge organize highly specific elements of a
more complex reality’. 61 In Ecology without Nature, Morton introduces
the idea of the ‘mesh’ as a way of understanding connections and
separations among the objects of the world, while denying that there is
some basic substance hovering in the background of all things. To think
the ‘mesh’, Morton says, is to think connections and blank spaces; the
latter the (no)thing that connects all things.62
What these approaches to nature have in common is an
acknowledgement that the idea of nature is inscribed by philosophical
and paradigmatic assumptions and by political, economic and historical
practices. While the approaches of Latour, Morin, Hornborg and the
speculative realists offer compelling theoretical challenges to the
hegemony of anthropocentrism and ontological dualism, they are
perhaps lacking in guidance as to how (and indeed whether) this
hegemony might be avoided in practice. As Andrew Pickering observes:
‘Philosophical critiques of dualism in its many guises are ten-apenny. We all know several versions. But they tend to remain toothless
and trapped in the realm of ideas. Why might that be? It might be
because non-dualist ideas find so little purchase in the made-world of
our culture, the culture we have already assembled and find ourselves
plunged into. We live in a world of objects and projects that continually
echo back to us the truth of asymmetric dualism.’ 63
61

.

62

Id.

. Timothy
Morton,
NaughtThought
(June
20,
http://naughtthought.wordpress.com/2008/06/20/heaps-of-slime-or-towards-aspeculative-realist-politics/.
63

2008),

. Andrew Pickering, Producing Another World, ‘Assembling Culture’
Workshop, University of Melbourne, Australia, 10-11 December 2007, 11, available at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved
=0CC4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Flifeboat.com%2Fboard%2Fandrew.pickering.do
c&ei=kyuhUc75O5Pm9gT00oGIBw&usg=AFQjCNEtPCaxPG3foOT7xr531lbLPp144
Q&sig2=ESRovWOlyeoUNoWO43jOaw&bvm=bv.47008514,d.eWU.

2013] MAPPING THE TERRAIN OF EARTH JURISPRUDENCE

21

Pickering suggests that in the cultural assemblage we now inhabit,
perhaps asymmetric dualism has become the ‘natural ontological
attitude’, one which informs our grasp of the world we are living in and
how we might imagine transforming it.
So where does this discussion leave ‘nature’ other than as a
confounded and problematic concept and what are the implications of
these frameworks for an earth justice system predicated on rights for
nature? For pragmatic and strategic purposes, will scholars and
practitioners of earth jurisprudence be compelled to agree on a
‘working’ definition of nature, while acknowledging its limitations?
Certainly, the ‘promiscuous concept’ of nature requires a more
comprehensive investigation. While its emergent discourse continues to
problematize the human-nature dualism, earth jurisprudence has yet to
comprehensively investigate the ontological and epistemological issues
associated with the idea of nature. What can be said about earth
jurisprudence is that it is informed by largely unproblematized notions
of nature predicated on biological ‘systems’ characterized by
interrelationships between constituent parts.64
In proposing a closer relationship between nature and humankind,
for example, Thomas Berry famously opined that ‘nature is a subject
and not a collection of objects’.65 Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic identified
a holistic natural community of which humans and other beings are a
part. 66 Similarly, Arne Næss argued that human beings are constituent
parts of one single natural system and are interdependent with the other
components.67 More recently, James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis
64

. See The United Nations Economic and Social Council, Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues, ‘Study on the need to recognize and respect the rights of Mother
Earth’, Ninth Session, New York, 19-30 April 2010 Item 7 of the provisional agenda,
United Nations E/C.19/2010/4. Such ‘system’ approaches are, of course, not novel
ones. Indigenous conceptions of nature, such as the Andean concept of Pachamama
(‘Mother Earth’) and of Suma Qamaña or ‘living well’ are predicated upon symbiosis
between humankind and nature and regard the relationship of the human political
community with the Earth as one of intimate belonging. For a detailed consideration of
historical and cultural frameworks informing the notion of Pachamama,.
65
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IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 103 (Mary Evelyn Tucker ed., 2009).
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OF AN ECOSOPHY (David Rothenberg trans., 1989).
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envisages the Earth as a single organism in which all parts are as
interrelated and as interdependent as the cells of the human body.68
Fritjof Capra proposes an integrating vision of the universe as a network
of relations,69 while Peter Burdon remarks that ‘nature consists of
networks, operating within networks’.70 Finally, the integral ecology
movement is based on the idea that there is no single environment or
macroecological unity to which multiple species and populations
belong, but an interconnected multiplicity of eco-evolutionary
processes.71
Speculative realism may provide to earth jurisprudence some
frameworks by which ideas of nature and natural systems may be more
comprehensively investigated and articulated. Although there is an
apparent tension between an ‘ecology of objects’ and Thomas Berry’s
‘communion of subjects’, both approaches envisage non-hierarchical
relationships between entities. Perhaps the major points of difference are
generational and semantic, the result of the ‘natural ontological attitude’
suggested by Pickering. Whatever their differences, it might be
supposed that Berry’s suggestion that ‘biosystems deserve the
opportunity to be themselves and to express their own inner qualities’ is
one which resonates with the ‘strange strangers’ of speculative realism.
Commonalities can also be identified among speculative realism
and views expressed by Alfred North Whitehead over seven decades
ago. Whitehead argued that the abstractions of linguistic expression
‘lead…away from the realities of the immediate world’, and regarded all
questions concerning the ‘essence’ of nature as ‘speculative
approximations’.72 Although he didn’t refer to it as such, his relational
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perspective allowed for the emergence of a ‘flat ontology’ which the
position of everything in nature is given only in terms of the relations it
bears to other things.73 As Jeremy Dunham notes, Whitehead’s approach
does not enable humans to stand condescendingly higher than nature, as
in anthropocentric humanism, nor does it allow nature to be regarded as
higher than human life, as in the biocentrism of radical anti-humanist
ecologism. Dunham argues that Whitehead’s philosophy ‘remains the
most convincing theory regarding the laws of nature’ and that while
subsequent philosophical arguments may have become more
sophisticated, the central arguments remain almost the same.74
III. THRESHOLD: THE LAWS OF NATURE AND HUMAN GOVERNANCE
‘To shift from …a lofty fancy as the planetarization of
consciousness to the operation of our municipal legal system is to
75
come down to earth hard.’

While there are some who suggest otherwise, it is argued here that
the concept of rights is a juridical one and not a quality which inheres in
nature. For this reason, it is suggested that a concept of rights for nature
better reflects the normative quality of anthropocentric interventions
than does a concept of rights of nature. Thomas Berry’s assertion that
rights are ‘primordial’ and originate where existence originates, and that
rights are structured by the nature of that existence, is one conceived in
what Christopher Stone refers to as ‘socio-psychic’ terms as opposed to
‘legal operational’ ones.76 To this extent, rights have both ontological
and normative qualities. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to
enter into a discussion of the positivism-natural law debate, it is argued
that any suggestion that juridical concepts have their origin in nature
should be approached with caution. This is because implicit in
73
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2001). See also Mike Bell, Thomas Berry and an Earth Jurisprudence: An Exploratory
Essay, 19(1) THE TRUMPETER 69 (2003).
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primordial conceptions of rights is both a problematic conceptual
separation of the ‘natural’ from the ‘not natural’ and a reiteration of a
contestable natural law doctrine in which nature and its laws are
regarded as a transcendent authority.77 As Whitehead opined, ‘there are
no natural laws but only temporary habits of nature’. 78 And because the
idea of nature itself is tainted by human exceptionalism, it follows that a
concept of ‘natural’ rights is inherently problematic:
‘Like a harlot, natural law is at the disposal of everyone. The
ideology does not exist that cannot be defended by an appeal to the law
of nature.’79
Although he fails to clearly explain the relationship between a non
anthropocentric earth justice system and a human justice system, Mike
Bell asserts that ‘we cannot conceive of the rights of Earth through
anthropocentric conceptions of human rights’ because ‘trying to use a
human jurisprudence system to recognize and protect the rights of other
species is a bit like sending the fox to guard the chickens’.80 He suggests
that ‘because a human jurisprudence is a system of laws designed to
recognize the pre-eminence of the human species, it is unlikely that a
human jurisprudence can serve as a suitable framework for an earth
jurisprudence’.81 With reference to Thomas Berry, Bell contends that an
earth jurisprudence is not a human creation but ‘something that already
exists in nature’:
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rationalism and chaos; between law and nature. These forces were known as nomos
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‘And just as we do not create the laws of nature but, rather, seek to
recognize them understand their implications, so it is with an earth
jurisprudence.’82
Bell’s suggestion causes us to wonder how we might ‘recognise
and understand’ the implications of nature’s laws for the purposes of
their incorporation in human juridical processes. And as cultural
geographer, Daniel Demerrit argues, if nature simply ‘is’ then it
becomes very difficult to talk about the power/knowledge relations
enabled by the material and discursive preservation of nature’s essential
reality.’83
Some assistance may be derived from Christopher Stone’s
pragmatic recognition of both the normative and ontological aspects of
rights. As Stone notes, an entity cannot be said to hold a legal right
unless and until some public authoritative body is prepared to provide
some ‘amount’ of review to actions that are inconsistent with that right.
84

In addition to the question of whether an entity can be said to
‘possess’ rights, any attempt to identify the juridical content of rights for
nature will also raises a host of questions. 85
Judith Koons asks:
‘Should such rights extend to include all living beings or the entire
Earth community (including rocks, rivers, and mountains). For
example, what about weeds? Are gardeners morally prohibited from
killing weeds? Is a mosquito the moral equal of a human being,
triggering a no killing, positive-regard rule?...How should a line of
sugar ants in the kitchen be treated? Since a swarm of termites
82
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thus for obscuring the real bases of inequality
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outnumber people in a building, should it be allowed to destroy the
building? How is a river or a mountain to be counted, under a
86
broader utilitarian assessment?’

Koons notes that in many accounts, nonliving natural objects are
denied moral standing because they are considered to lack interests that
are capable of being harmed or benefitted. She argues, however, that
even if an entity is held to lack ‘interests,’ that should not foreclose the
entity from moral consideration. In this regards, she agrees with Berry
that things in nature have interests ‘in being’.87
The consensus definition of Earth Jurisprudence recently endorsed
by the Centre for Earth Jurisprudence at Barry Law School, Florida
recognizes both the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ implicit in an earth justice
system:
‘Earth Jurisprudence seeks Earth-centered approaches to law and
governance. As an integral part of the broader Earth community,
humanity has responsibility to act for the well-being of the planet and
future generations. Earth Jurisprudence draws forth Earth-centered
comprehensive solutions from within as well as beyond existing law.’88
The tension between a theory of earth justice and the practice of an
earth justice system will involve the exponents of earth jurisprudence in
a host of scientific, legal, political and ethical challenges. It will require
of its scholars and practitioners a negotiation of the official philosophy
of ecologism and its burgeoning political practice. Whether rights are
conceptualized and represented in moral, ethico-political and/or juridical
terms, transforming systems of environmental governance from ones in
which nature is regarded as a resource for human exploitation, to one
based on the recognition of natural ecosystems’ ‘primordial’ right to
86
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exist and flourish, will demand radical paradigmatic shifts with
significant implications for normative legal frameworks and processes.
Although what these implications are have yet to be determined.
Cormac Cullinan suggests that earth jurisprudence requires the ‘realignment of human governance systems with the fundamental
principles of how the universe functions’.89 In order to change
completely the purpose of our governance systems, he argues, we must
develop coherent new theories or philosophies of governance to
supplant the old. Even if we were able to ascertain such ‘fundamental
principles’, all human governance systems, and the theories which
inform them, Cullinan asserts, will raise normative questions relating to
their political and ethical legitimacy. 90
Perhaps, as Christopher Stone observes:
‘[A]t the level of praxis, an earth justice system will be
91
unavoidably anthropocentric.

IV. THRESHOLD: (RE)PRESENTING EARTH
While the legitimacy of democratic human centered governance
depends upon appeals to the presence of members of different groups,
they often do so without clear sources of authorization and
accountability from those represented. The representation of nonhumans
in deliberative institutions, John O’Neill observes, ‘is still more
problematic’. In the necessary absence of their authorization,
accountability, and presence, a claim to speak on behalf of non human
nature ‘relies on epistemic claims, coupled with care’.92
This paper has suggested that the culture-nature distinction is built
on power relations, discursively constituted through ‘technologies of
truth’ which function as a dividing practice. Because epistemic claims
are inextricably linked with processes of power and of biopolitical
normalization, any account of nature which purports to stand apart from
89
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humanist history and its relations of knowledge and power becomes
‘profoundly suspicious’. 93
Consequently, it is incumbent upon those concerned to develop an
earth centered system of governance to establish the epistemic
conditions of knowledge, including what sorts of information is
meaningful, who is recognized as speaking with accuracy and authority,
and who decides these questions. If one accepts Foucault’s premise that
the exercise of biopower produces and makes possible permissible
modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and/or making others
impossible, what epistemic claims should properly inform an earth
justice system and by what processes might such claims be determined?
It has been suggested that any earth justice system needs to be
cognizant of the asymmetrical power relations that persist in the world.
As Donald Turner argues, calculations of interests and consequences
may be inappropriate in the context of relationships which are
‘structurally non-contractual, asymmetrical and rooted in ontological
difference’.94
The discourse of earth jurisprudence needs to
acknowledge that ‘human’ and ‘nature’ do not encounter one another in
a symmetrical relationship, and that power and knowledge relations both
produce and enable the material and discursive conditions of nature’s
reality. It needs to acknowledge that both the biocentric language of
science and the anthropocentric concerns of humanism can function to
deflect consideration away from the processes of power by which nature
is determined and represented. For these reasons, holistic representations
of nature predicated upon reciprocity between human and non human
biophysical communities should be approached with caution.
Holistic notions of biological egalitarianism such as ‘mutually
enhancing relations’, ‘reciprocity’ and ‘creative cooperation’ appear as
central tenets in much earth jurisprudence discourse. For example, Linda
Warren describes earth jurisprudence as ‘the philosophy of laws and
regulations that gives formal recognition to the reciprocal relationship
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between humans and the rest of nature’. 95 Thomas Berry suggested that
an earth justice system is one that recognizes, honors and protects the
rights of all species, ‘to exist and fulfill mutual self-supporting
destinies.’96 Fritjof Capra’s notion of an ecological community is one of
‘an assemblage of organisms, bound into a functional whole by their
mutual relationships’.97
While some holistic approaches to nature accept the conflict and
violence of predator relationships and extreme atmospheric and
geological events as elements of Earth’s ‘unity’, others are
unproblematically grounded in notions of affinity.98 Holistic
representations of nature include those that regard nature as a beneficent
source of liberation and healing, and at their most extreme, as a utopian
paradisiacal refuge. Susan Emmenegger and Axel Tschentscher suggest
that in this form of holism, there is only one interested entity with one
unitary interest. As a result, ‘situations of conflicting interests are
impossible.’99 Jozef Keulartz has suggested that ‘people who see nature
as a divine text will be more likely to adopt a passive rather than an
active attitude towards nature.’ 100 And as Arne Næss acknowledged,
biospherical egalitarianism can be affirmed only in principle since ‘any
realistic praxis necessitates some killing, exploitation, and suppression.’
101
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Nonholistic approaches to nature range from those which regard
nature as a site of danger and a force for negation, destruction and
threat, to those which regard nature as an uncontrollable chaotic force:
‘Where has there ever been this Wisdom of Nature that regulates
things … No doubt, at this very moment, there are planets with rich
ecosystems being devoured by black holes. And indeed, there are
galaxies colliding, destroying the delicate balance of solar systems
where life is dependent on being a certain distance from their stars.
There are even rogue planets that travel their aleatory journey
throughout galaxies, destroying gravitational balances of solar systems
that harbor life.’ 102
The various perspectives outlined here demonstrate that that the
ways in which nature is understood and represented are the subject of
significant philosophical contestation. They suggest that the notion of a
‘mutually supporting’ Earth Community may be confounded by largely
unarticulated premises.
Frederick Ferre states that he finds it ‘impossibly grotesque’ to
think of humanity as ‘just another species’. He argues that ‘perspectival
anthropocentrism’ is inevitable and ‘perfectly licit’.103 Although
humans are right to be anguished and outraged about what we have done
to harm earth, Ferre argues ‘there is no point in feigning that we are not
distinctly human’. Ferre contends that because perspectival
anthropocentrism is unavoidable, it cannot be regarded as
anthropocentric in ‘any objectionable’ way. Rather, he suggests, humans
need to explore a relational ethic that is ‘healthily polycentric’:
‘Many environmental thinkers are torn in two opposing directions
at once. For good reasons we are appalled by the damage that has been
done to the earth by the ethos of heedless anthropocentric
individualism…But also for good reasons we are repelled, at the other
extreme, by environmentally correct images of mindless biocentric
collectivisms in which precious personal values are overridden for the
good of some healthy beehive ‘whole’.’ 104
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Whether or not one agrees with Ferre’s perspectival
anthropocentrism, a threshold issue for an earth justice system is
whether its effectiveness as a conceptual and juridical system requires
an abandonment of arguably unavoidable anthropocentric frames of
reference. Can an earth justice system be conceptualized and function as
a form of ‘strategic’ or ‘normative’ anthropocentrism or does its efficacy
depend upon, as Leopold and other deep ecologists seem to suggest, a
‘subversive non-anthropocentric humanism’? While we may imagine a
sensibility which extends ethical responsibility from a humanistic centre
to a multiplicity of ontologically marginalized others, do the pragmatic
imperatives of normative juridical interventions compel us to ‘think the
mountain’ like a human?105
V. HORIZON: ASSEMBLAGES
‘Understanding our ontological condition as a performative dance
of agency with human and nonhuman others is precisely not to
dwell on our specialness-it is to step outside the moralized space of
106
human exceptionalism’.

This paper has identified a range of issues relating to ‘nature,
‘rights’ and representation that exponents of an earth justice system
predicated on rights for nature will be required to negotiate. It has
identified the fraught relationship between human systems of
governance and ‘natural’ entities, and has suggested that the ways in
which humans see themselves in relation to nature will impact upon
political and ecological practice. It suggests that if nature can be
comprehended only as an abstract construction upon which cultural,
political and scientific modes of knowledge are inscribed, that the
identification of the subject and content of juridical rights for nature will
be a matter of contestation and negotiation.
Kerry Whiteside observes that ‘nature has long served as one of
political theory’s most significant Others’ but that the distinction
between nature and politics is not as neat as most political theorists
imagine.107 While the anthropocentrism intrinsic to the western
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philosophical tradition continues to obstruct responses to ecological
crises, this paper suggests that emergent challenges to human
exceptionalism such as those provided by speculative realism are
valuable to the development of earth justice systems predicated on rights
for nature. It is also recognized that, at this stage in its development, the
theory and practice of earth jurisprudence occupies both unruly and
creative territory, one which requires scholars and practitioners to
negotiate a heterogeneous terrain.
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